ZK Circuit Registry

Zero-knowledge circuit identifiers and hashes embedded in NØNOS.

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Core Circuits

These circuits are hardcoded in the bootloader (highest trust level):

BOOT_AUTHORITY Circuit

Name:         BOOT_AUTHORITY
Category:     Core
Permissions:  BootAuthority, Attestation

Program Hash: fa02d10e8804169a47233e34a6ff3566248958adff55e1248d50304aff4ab230
VK Hash:      bf6d8ae8b77c2c0bb9ee46c8a847dfba9114363738cb22f28703a6cd9451a584

Domain:       "NONOS:ZK:PROGRAM:v1"

UPDATE_AUTHORITY Circuit

Name:         UPDATE_AUTHORITY
Category:     Core
Permissions:  UpdateAuthority

Program Hash: 8b3ca7195ef2710adc4592b86d33aa4f17e9285c447bf6913ace08d5621f73e4
VK Hash:      bf6d8ae8b77c2c0bb9ee46c8a847dfba9114363738cb22f28703a6cd9451a584

Domain:       "NONOS:ZK:PROGRAM:v1"

RECOVERY_KEY Circuit

Name:         RECOVERY_KEY
Category:     Core
Permissions:  RecoveryKey

Program Hash: 2f9158c4a36bdd876e12149f5708ce13ab924670d5fa83c16ee7d954201bacf58
VK Hash:      bf6d8ae8b77c2c0bb9ee46c8a847dfba9114363738cb22f28703a6cd9451a584

Domain:       "NONOS:ZK:PROGRAM:v1"

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Verifying Key (VK)

The BOOT_AUTHORITY verifying key (584 bytes, BLS12-381):

a15e3012b17588d8f3d7ac61afcf2a4d44edae7b1a3dff4f57acd2755858e5ec
0c0c05612fa339d8f68b83b73689c2c70a480f1a32161614f1ffef5c4a6836f1
93a83e7aee13ebb9aaca596ba93f8e1b7624c95757d3423ad671b714eee20ab5
e0c4e1363d4e4f5afed1b21cf4bd965fa7c583b5ad1ff1d8ba6daf1bb8863f9e
fb4389e04c1cb105efcb19097fc073ceadf7a99ad8e718a2c4046...
(584 bytes total, truncated for display)

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Permission Flags

Each circuit has a permission bitmap:

Permission	Bit	Hex Value
BootAuthority	0	0x00000001
UpdateAuthority	1	0x00000002
RecoveryKey	2	0x00000004
CommunityKey	3	0x00000008
UserCircuit	4	0x00000010
Attestation	5	0x00000020
CircuitAdmin	6	0x00000040
NetworkAccess	7	0x00000080
FilesystemAccess	8	0x00000100
HardwareAccess	9	0x00000200

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Circuit Categories

Category	Trust Level	Source	Can Modify
Core	Highest	Compiled into bootloader	Bootloader update only
System	High	Signed ELF sections	Kernel update
Community	Medium	N-of-M multisig	Governance vote
User	Sandboxed	User-installed	User action

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Section Magic

ZK circuit sections are identified by magic bytes:

Magic: 0x4E 0xC3 0x5A 0x4B
ASCII: "NØZK"

Groth16 Proof Format

Component	Size	Description
A	48 bytes	G1 point (compressed)
B	96 bytes	G2 point (compressed)
C	48 bytes	G1 point (compressed)
Total	192 bytes	Complete proof

Proof Limits

Limit	Value
Max Public Inputs	256 KB
Max Proof Size	2 MB
Verification Time	~5 ms

Domain Separators

Domain	Purpose
NONOS:ZK:PROGRAM:v1	Program hash derivation
NONOS:CIRCUIT_KEY:v1	Circuit key derivation
NONOS:CAPSULE:COMMITMENT:v1	Default commitment binding

Hash Derivation

Program hashes are derived using BLAKE3:

let program_hash = blake3::derive_key(
    "NONOS:ZK:PROGRAM:v1",
    &circuit_definition_bytes
);

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Capsule Metadata

ZK proofs are wrapped in capsules:

CapsuleMetadata {
    offset_sig: usize,
    len_sig: usize,
    offset_payload: usize,
    len_payload: usize,
    signer_keyid: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    payload_hash: [u8; 32],
    header_version: u32,
    header_timestamp: u64,
}

Verification Flow

1. Extract proof from capsule
2. Look up circuit by program_hash
3. Verify circuit has required permissions
4. Deserialize proof (A, B, C points)
5. Compute public input commitment
6. Verify: e(A,B) = e(α,β) · e(L,γ) · e(C,δ)
7. Return VALID or INVALID

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Adding New Circuits

System Circuit

1. Define circuit constraints

2. Run trusted setup ceremony

3. Compute program hash

4. Embed VK in kernel

5. Register in SYSTEM_CIRCUITS

Community Circuit

1. Define circuit and run setup

2. Submit to governance

3. Collect N-of-M signatures

4. Register via community process

User Circuit

1. Define circuit locally

2. Run setup locally

3. Install via user API

4. Runs sandboxed (limited permissions)

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Circuit Tools

Tool	Location	Purpose
zk-embed	nonos-boot/tools/zk-embed	Embed VK in binary
zk-ceremony	nonos-boot/tools/zk-ceremony	MPC setup
attestation-circuit	nonos-boot/tools/nonos-attestation-circuit	Attestation circuit